INTRODUCTION
THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER is to explore the extent to which standard, general equilibrium analysis of Pareto optima and of competitive equilibria can be applied to economies with moral hazard and adverse selection problems. In these economies the information structure is explicit but private. Of particular interest are the Rothschild-Stiglitz [21] , Wilson [23] insurance economy, in which each agent observes a parameter indicating the probability of suffering a loss, that is, whether he is a high risk or low risk agent; a Spence [22] signaling economy, in which each agent observes a parameter indicating his inherent productivity as well as the direct or indirect disutility of some unproductive activity; a moral hazard insurance economy in which agents can take an unobserved action determining the probability of suffering a loss; and a private-information labor market economy in which households suffer unobserved shocks to preferences (or to an underlying household production function).
We proceed by showing in Section 2 that despite the apparent diversity among the above-mentioned economies, each can be viewed as a special case of a simple general structure with convex constraints and preferences. This is accomplished household and involves commitments to supply labor in return for the consumption good. Firms in our labor market economy are viewed as producerintermediaries which make commitments to hire labor and produce the consumption good. Again, the commitments are priced in a competitive market and firms .maximize profits. The implication of this section is that unemployment, overemployment, and random assignments, being consistent with optimal contracts, are also consistent with competitive equilibrium allocations. We have, in effect, taken a step toward a synthesis of the implicit labor contract paradigm of Azariadas [4] , Bailey [5] , and Gordon [11] with standard competitive analysis.
The final section of the paper briefly reports on our efforts to secure standard existence and optimality theorems for all economies consistent with the general structure and offers an instructive contrast to our results for the privateinformation labor market economy (among others). Apparently, there can be a fundamental (unavoidable) adverse selection problem if agents with characteristics which are distinct and privately observed at the time of initial trading enter the economy-wide resource constraints in a heterogenous way, as is the case for the adverse selection insurance and the signaling economies.
THE ECONOMIES

Basic Mathematical Structure
There are a finite number of agent types i = 1, . .. , I and a continuum of each type. The fraction of agents of type i is denoted by Ai. The commodity space is a linear space L and the common consumption possibility set for each agent type, X c L, is closed and convex. The utility function of each agent of type i, Ui: X -R, is concave (and frequently linear). The endowment of each agent is ( E L, the same for all agent types. Each agent's type is private information. The commodity space, consumption set, utility functions, and endowment will all be given more precise interpretations in the example-economies which follow.
Let xi E L be a consumption allocation to each agent of type i. The first requirement is that the consumption vector belong to the individuals' consumption possibility set. The second is that each individual of type i weakly prefer xi to all the other xj. Thus it is not in the interest of any agent to claim to be of some other type. These are the ex ante incentive-compatibility constraints. Certain ex post incentive-compatibility constraints arise naturally in consideration of the set of all allowable contracts (see below) and thus help to determine the common consumption possibility set X. Justification for restricting attention to the class of allocations satisfying the incentive-compatibility constraints can be found in Harris and Townsend [14, 15] and Myerson [18] , building on the seminal work of Hurwicz [16] . The third condition is again the set of resource constraints. In much of this paper L is assumed to have finite dimension. The assumption that L has finite dimension simplifies the presentation without the loss of anything essential. Then, if both the ui(-) and rik Each agent has preferences on C c R + as defined by the utility function U: R + -* R where U is strictly concave, strictly increasing, and continuously differentiable with U'(0) = oo. The points zo and z, belong to C. Suppose a consumer is assigned co if a loss is suffered and cl if one is not. The expected utility for an agent of type i is then 9i U(CO) + (1 -i ) U(c1) where c0, cl E C.
This environment can be cast in terms of the basic mathematical structure. One approach is to let L be R 2. Then let xi be a consumption allocation to agents of type i with the first component being ci0 and the second cil. The common endowment is ( = (z0, z ). Then X corresponds to C x C and is closed and convex provided C is closed and convex. The single linear resource constraint is But the space of consumption allocations (xi) restricted by such constraints is not convex given the strict concavity of U. An alternative approach which results in the utility function being linear, and therefore avoids the nonconvexities associated with the incentive compatibility constraints, is to consider lotteries on C. In order that the space L be finite dimensional, the set C is assumed finite with n elements. The lotteries are n-dimensional vectors specifying the probability of each point in C, say yt It is also assumed here that fraction [t0(c) of agents of type i who suffer a loss receive the allocation c and similarly for yt1(c), so that lotteries introduce no aggregate randomness. The endowment ( is a pair of probability distributions on C, the first one of which assigns probability one to z0 E C and the second probability one to z1 E C. This latter economy can be put into the general mathematical structure as follows. Let L = R 2n. Let the first n elements of a consumption vector x, denoted x0, be the xoc = AO(c) defined above for c E C, and let the second n elements of x, denoted xl, be the xIC = At1(c) for c E C. The consumption possibility set then requires that x0 and xl be probability distributions; that is, X = {tx E L: ,xoc = 1, xic = 1, x ?O} C C Let the first n elements of the utility function ui be the 9i U(c) for c E C and the second n elements (1 -9) U(c) for c E C. With these definitions Ui(X) = Ui * X = Wi(/0, 5') which is just the expected utility to an i-type of lottery t,o if a loss is suffered and lottery /i if one is not.
= ( t(c)
The common endowment t is an element of L. The resource constraint is that average consumption be less than or equal to the average endowment: The adverse-selection insurance economy E1 is modified as follows. There is only one type of agent, so we can ignore the Xi in what follows, but the probability of loss depends upon a costly, private action of the agent. More precisely, each agent receives a random endowment z E Z = { zo, z1 } with 0 < zo < zI and the probability of z given the agent's action a E A = {a1,a2, ... , am} is z Ia. The realization of z is public, the action taken is not. Also, the larger is action a, the smaller is the probability of loss Oz. I a. The interpretation here is that a larger action corresponds to an agent being more careful. This is a standard set-up.
Each agent has preferences on the finite set C x A, where C is a finite subset of R + and has n elements. Preferences are defined by a utility function U(c, a) where U is increasing in c, decreasing in a, and concave. For (c, a) E C X A, let Uca = U(c, a).
In terms of our basic mathematical structure, let the linear space L be the Euclidean space of dimension n2m. A consumption vector x is a triply indexed element (xcza) for c E C, z E Z, and a E A. The interpretation is as follows. A lottery with probabilities xa first determines an action a for each agent. Number xa is also the fraction of agents in the population who are to take action a. Conditional on this action a, a second lottery with probabilities xcz I a determines consumption c and endowment z of the agent. Of course, nature plays a role in this second lottery since the conditional probabilities ozla are technologically determined constraints. In fact it is required that C for consistency. Finally, the marginal and conditional distributions xa and xczI a determine the joint distribution Xcza specified above.
Agents have preferences on X where The first constraint is that the probabilities sum to one. The second is that the probability distribution of z given a (if defined for that probability distribution) equals the technologically determined probability 9z I a. The third constraint is to ensure incentive compatibility. This is not obvious and is derived as follows. The commodity point x must be structured such that if a occurs, it is not in the interest of the agent to choose some other action a'; that is, XaE Uca xczIa? XaE Uca'Prtc,zIa'}. , it is natural to index the (c, 1) bundle by the household-specific shocks. Shocks are private to the household, however, so to circumvent incentive problems, we suppose each individual household is assigned a contract which specifies consumption, labor supply pairs (c, 1) under a variety of individually3The introduction of shocks to preferences may seem somewhat artificial. But the economy is readily given a deeper, more satisfactory interpretation. Suppose in particular that labor can be supplied also to a household production function, that is, there is a technology for transforming labor input into output of an idiosyncratic, home-produced good, a good which cannot be transferred among households. Suppose also that the household production function is subject to privatelyobserved technology shocks, 0. Finally, suppose households have preferences over consumption of the market-produced good, the home-produced good, and total labor supply. Then this specification delivers an indirect utility function (as in the text) over consumption of the market-produced good and over market labor supply. effected contingencies or options. For example, the contract might allow "sick" leaves, voluntary overtime, and so on, in addition to the "work-as-usual" option. (There is no monitoring of underlying circumstances.) The point is that the household itself chooses which option to effect subsequent to its underlying circumstance, its shock 9. Now under any contract an individual household will act in its own best interest, inducing a natural ordering on outcomes, (c, 1) pairs, relative to its 9-contingent utility function. Thus, we may adopt a more abstract, canonical representation for any contract, following Harris and Townsend [14, 15] , and Myerson [18] , and suppose, without loss of generality, that households make direct announcements of their shocks 9 and that contracts are such that these announcements are made truthfully. Finally, we suppose the further possibility that a contract specifies a random (c, 1) bundle, conditional on an announcement 9. For example, laborers may report to work under some circumstances, but there need be no guarantee of employment.
More formally then the labor market economy with planning period contracts is cast in terms of the basic mathematical structure as follows. First, to ensure that the commodity space is finite-dimensional, restrict attention to a finite number n of consumption-labor supply pairs (c, 1). Then let the commodity space L be R2n. The first n components of a consumption vector x E L, with typical elements, x1(c,l), assign probability to consumption-labor supply pairs conditional upon the announcement 9 = 1, with a similar interpretation for the second n components and 9 = 2. Households are alike ex ante in the planning period (but not ex post), so the X, and i may be dropped from the notation. The expected utility of the representative household is then U (X) =2, AS E xo (C, I) UO This ensures both that the x9 are probability measures for each 9 and that in the consumption period each household will truthfully reveal its shock 9. The endowment t E L is the element for which $0(c, 1) = 0 unless (c, 1) = (0, 0), i.e., 4 puts all probability on the zero point in the underlying commodity space. The resource constraint is that average consumption not exceed average production, that is E Xo 2, x0 (c, l )c < 2 ,A E x0 (c, l )al. To prove the second statement consider some y > 0 and some allocation x E 4(y). Suppose x can be Pareto dominated. Then x cannot be a solution to the -y-program. This contradiction establishes that solutions to such programs are Pareto optima.
To prove the last statement of the lemma, let x be a solution to some y-program with the specified nondominance property, but suppose x is not an optimum. Then there exists an allocation x' which Pareto dominates x. By assumption, x' does not belong to 4(y). But the value of x' for the -y-program is at least as great as the value for x, and thus x' must be a solution to the -y-program, the desired contradiction. Our examples with lotteries all assume that the underlying consumption possibilities set C has a finite number of points. This is sufficient to ensure that set X is compact, a result that is used in the existence argument. There is a straightforward extension of the result to the case of C being a compact separable metric space, for example, a closed and bounded subset of R n with the Euclidean metric; with the weak topology, the set of probability measures on the Borel subsets of C is compact (under these weaker conditions) and the functions defining the objective and constraints are continuous. When the constraint set is defined by the finite set of linear inequalities (other than the nonnegativity constraints), a stronger version of Lemma 3. the left-hand side of (3.8) is strictly concave function of c and so attains a maximum at a single point (on the assumption that the set C can be made arbitrarily large). In summary the result is that xlOc equals one for some c E C and zero otherwise. By precisely the same argument, probability measures x, x20, and x21 place all their mass on single points denoted by cll, c20, and c21, respectively. These points depend upon the weights y chosen.
One implementable allocation is for everyone to consume z independent of their realized endowment. The utility for this allocation is U(z) for everyone. If one agent type realizes expected utility exceeding U(z), that type's expected consumption, by Jensen's inequality, must exceed z. This implies via the resource constraint that the expected consumption of the other type agents is less than z and, by Jensen's inequality, their expected utility less than U(z).
We divide the Pareto optima into three sets. The first is for everyone to consume z with certainty. The second set contains those optima for which the expected utility of type one agents exceeds U(z) and the third are those for which the expected utility of type one agents is less than U(z).
It can be established that for set two there is no uncertainty in consumption for type two agents (i.e., c20= C21 = c2). Suppose the contrary. By eliminating uncertainty in the consumption of type two agents (if there is any) while preserving their expected consumption, the utility of type two agents is increased, the resource constraint continues to be satisfied, and slack is introduced into constraint (3.1). Note that constraint (3.2) continues to be satisfied: expected consumption of type two agents is less than I in set two so the type one agents strictly prefer their allocation xl which yields expected utility greater than U(z) to the no uncertainty x2 allocation. This also establishes that A2 = 0 in set two. As c2 approaches z, the distance between c1O and c11 goes to zero. Therefore, given that U is continuously differentiable, for c2 sufficiently near z, this inequality is satisfied. Thus, Pareto optima set two is nonempty. Finally, let e2 be the minimal level for which inequality (3.13) is satisfied. Then it holds for all c2 < c2 < z. If this were not the case, the utility possibility set would not be convex. The argument for characterizing optima set three is symmetric with respect to the agents' types with some obvious exceptions necessitated by the fact that 92> >.
To characterize optima for set three interchange subscripts for the two agent types with the exception that one uses the solution to (3.10) and (3.1 1) for which c20 > c2, and the direction of inequality (3.13) is reversed.
As condition (3.10), (3.11), and (3.13) along with the additional requirement that the contracts be actuarially fair are just those for the optimality of the Rothschild-Stiglitz separating equilibrium allocation, that allocation is Pareto optimal in our larger class of allocations as well.
Randomness in consumption is used to separate the agents. The agent type realizing the higher expected utility incurs the uncertainty. The cost of this uncertainty is less to agents of that type and they are more than compensated for it by higher expected consumption.
Pareto Optima for the Private-Information Labor Market Economy
This subsection makes the point that the introduction of private information alone into an otherwise standard environment can produce not only apparent inefficiencies such as unemployment of labor but also a random assignment of labor supplied in a world where all households are averse to risk. The key to this conclusion is that ex post full-information inefficiencies and randomness are both consistent with ex ante private-information optimal allocations.
The An interior solution to the unconstrained program generally will not satisfy the incentive constraints. To see this, note that in such a solution consumptions are necessarily equal across agent types, say, equal to c. So, to satisfy the incentive constraints labor supplied must be equal as well, say, equal to 1. Then from the resource constraint, c = al. But the points at which W4(l) = aV'(al) generally will differ for the two 9 types. Thus, with incentive constraints imposed, the best deterministic allocation yields value strictly less than the optima when they are not imposed. We now introduce lotteries into labor supply and make the point that with differences in risk aversion such lotteries can lessen the impact of incentive constraints. The example just described illustrates in a dramatic way the gain to lotteries; here the utility of a full-information optimum can be achieved, though, in general, we think full-information optimality an inappropriate welfare criterion. But the example is unsatisfactory for this subsection in that labor supply is not ex post inefficient; despite the randomness, the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for labor supply for all households equals the marginal product of labor.
We now establish that there must be randomness in labor supply for economies sufficiently close to this special economy with all types strictly risk averse in labor supply. We also establish that there can be no randomness in consumption for either type. With randomness in a type's labor supply, otherwise identical agents supply different quantities of labor. Thus, with constant consumption, the ex post marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor supply cannot equal the corresponding marginal rate of transformation for all agents of that type. We now establish that for some economies there must be randomness in labor supply for some agent type. We assume V(c) = ln(c), W2(l) = 12/3, and WI(l) = 1A, 1 K< ,. The limit as ,8 approaches one is the parametric example considered previously. For the limit 8 = 1, we have shown that the best deterministic allocation yields an expected utility that is strictly less than the value of the optimum in the space of lotteries. It can be established by a careful continuity argument that this must also be true for all ,B in some open right-neighborhood of one. This establishes the need for lotteries on labor supply for some economies with all types strictly risk averse.
The randomness in labor supply requires that at the deterministic optimum, the agent supplying less labor be sufficiently less risk averse in labor supply. Then, by introducing randomness in that type's labor supply and reducing differences in consumption between types, the incentive problems can be lessened and expected ex ante utility increased.
COMPETITIVE CONTRACT MARKETS IN ECONOMIES WITH MORAL-HAZARD
In this section we define a standard competitive equilibrium in our commodity space. That is, we define the price system on the linear space L, and optimal actions are defined relative to that price system. In equilibrium, consumption choices are maximal in the budget set, a production choice maximizes profits in the production possibilities set, and markets clear. Thus the economy is decentralized in the usual way. As it turns out, such a competitive equilibrium construct is successful in the moral hazard insurance economy, the privateinformation labor market economy, and virtually any other economy in which the coefficients rik of the resource constraint (2.3) do not depend on i, that is, rik= rk for all i. That is, in such environments competitive equilibria exist, are optimal, have a natural market interpretation, and yet are capable of explaining apparent nonmarket clearing phenomena. We illustrate this success in the context of the private-information labor market economy.
We should perhaps reiterate here that we are following the Arrow and Debreu treatment of time and uncertainty. Our competitive contract markets operate at some initial date, and the contracts or commodities which are traded are commitments to take specified, possibly random, actions under various possible contingencies. As time evolves and observed and unobserved states of nature are realized, these commitments (contracts) are honored. Thus there are no ex post spot markets, though here these might be mutually beneficial ex post. We do not pretend to offer here a theory of the determination of market structure or legally enforceable agreements.
We begin by following Prescott and Townsend [19] , defining a productionintermediation set Y in such a way that y E Y and a standard market clearing condition iXiX(xi -{) = y imply the resource constraint (2.3). Namely let How will the competitive equilibrium allocation be effected? As is standard in general equilibrium competitive analysis, the market assignment process and the price-determination process are unspecified. To be more specific though, we might suppose that there are a finite number of marketeers or labor-brokers which make up the planning period market. Each broker has called out the competitive equilibrium price vector and has attracted a representative pool of workers and one firm-intermediary (the brokers are really households themselves). Each household in the pool of the broker has entered into the contract {xg,(c, 1) ). The firm has committed itself to input-output vector {yg*(c, l)}. Next, in the consumption period, each household truthfully announces its shock 9. If { xf,(c, 1)) is not degenerate in labor supply, then the broker uses some random sorting device to select workers from its pool in the proper proportions. These are directed to the firm consistent with planning period demand. The consumption good is then produced and distributed by the broker to all workers in the pool in accordance with { x(c, 1)}, as if under a wage-benefit or insurance package. We are assuming, of course, that planning period contracts are honored (or costlessly enforced by a legal system); that is, there can be no collusion in labor supply among households (say to eliminate risk) and no ex post spot markets. Now suppose an outside observer were to see the realized outcome of a competitive equilibrium allocation. We have just established that such an allocation is optimal, so we know its properties from Section 3. But these properties might lead the outside observer to conclude that the realized outcome is inconsistent with the competitive market paradigm: if labor and output are fully observed, then the constant marginal product of labor might be inferred. That then might naturally be taken as the wage rate. If households were asked to indicate whether they would like to work more at that wage rate, some would so indicate. Thus there would be measured unemployment (nonmarket clearing). Moreover, the outside observer might see disparities in employment among households who indicate they are otherwise identical, as if employment were capricious or random. Conceivably, some households might be completely unemployed, while others work up to maximum capacity. But, again, such outcomes are not inconsistent with the competitive market paradigm if the objects which are traded are carefully defined. As we have indicated, such outcomes can be optimal from the ex ante point of view of the representative household, and can be achieved in competitive markets for labor contracts with appropriately specified options. We have, in effect, taken a step toward a synthesis implicit labor contract theory with standard competitive analysis.
STANDARD COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA IN ECONOMIES WITH ADVERSE SELECTION: THE DIFFICULTIES OF PRICE DECENTRALIZATION
Unlike the moral-hazard insurance and private-information labor market economies, the resource constraints in the adverse-selection insurance and signaling economies are of the form One attack on the inconsistency (adverse-selection) problem is to ignore it, with the hope that it fails to occur in equilibrium, in a standard competitive equilibrium, that is, in which decisions are completely decentralized by a price system. Thus, one might make use of the production-intermediation set (5.3) in the obvious commodity spaces. For the adverse-selection insurance economy, the obvious commodity space is the space of loss, no-loss consumption bundles. But that with (5.3) implies the same budget line for all household types, the (average) market-odds line of Rothschild-Stiglitz, and that with diversity across household-types implies the nonexistence of a standard competitive equilibrium. For the Spence signaling economy, the obvious commodity space is the space of commodity triplets specifying consumption, signal, and labor supply. But that with (5.3) implies a zero price for the signal, with labor priced in terms of the consumption good at the average productivity. Thus, a standard competitive exists for the Spence signaling economy, but it involves no signaling, the phenomenon which the model was intended to explain.
Motivated by these considerations one might hope to allow different agent types to choose different commodity bundles in equilibrium. Hence, we expanded the commodity space in an obvious way. Namely, for the Spence signaling economy we supposed different signals could be treated as different commodities, each with a potentially distinct price in terms of the consumption good. We also introduced a production-intermediation set, with coefficients in the technology which firms treat parametrically, but which in fact are functions of the households' equilibrium consumption choices. We then defined a standard competitive equilibrium with production externalities and established that all the Spence signaling equilibria are examples of equilibria of that kind, including the no-signaling equilibria, the minimal-signaling equilibria, and the over-signaling equilibria. Of course, many of these are Pareto nonoptimal; indeed, many can be Pareto ranked. We also established that an analogous procedure could be applied to the adverse-selection insurance economy to support a bewildering variety of standard competitive equilibria (with production externalities). Thus equilibria of this kind fail to provide much predictive content and have undesirable normative properties as well.
We also expanded the commodity space in a different way, following the spirit of Arrow [1] , with the intent of removing externalities. More specifically, we indexed the original commodity point in the general structure by i, thereby increasing the dimensionality by factor I. Again, the new commodity point has the interpretation of a contract with options which are effected by the individual households. In this expanded space there is a specification of the productionintermediation set (without externalities) which is always consistent with market clearing and the resource constraints. Thus one can consider an extension of the standard support theorem for Pareto optimal allocations. In fact, we established that there is a price system such that every Pareto optimum can be supported in a kind of competitive equilibrium. But the competitive equilibrium is restricted in that the assignment in the optimum to other agent types must be taken into account in each household's maximization problem. In effect, then, there are externalities in consumption. Moreover, the same support theorem can be used to establish that unrestricted competitive equilibria in the indexed commodity space generally do not exist for the signaling and adverse-selection insurance economies.
We conclude that there do seem to be fundamental problems for the operation of competitive markets for economies or situations which suffer from adverse selection. We have not discovered a standard competitive equilibrium construct which would predict well in such situations.
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